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Since initiated in the U.S. in July 1994, auctions have replaced “beauty contests” in the 
assignment of wireless licenses in many countries.  Economists have been involved in 
constructing the competitive bidding mechanisms chosen, and have devoted considerable 
analysis to the problems involved.  Generally, auction methods have been evaluated according to 
the receipts generated; social gains resulting from the displacement of activity-distorting taxes 
has motivated the welfare analysis.  Yet, policies widely advocated by economists to intensify 
license bidding – such as reservation prices or bidding credits for “weak” bidders – may impose 
deadweight losses that dominate revenue raising efficiencies.  Yet, retail market effects are 
largely excluded from cost-benefit calculations of rules to assign licenses.  This paper reviews a 
number of case studies suggesting that economic analysis is most usefully focused on consumer 
welfare in wireless service markets, the outputs resulting from license use.  Econometric 
evidence from mobile phone markets in twenty-nine countries suggests that auctions do not 
lower prices or increase usage, while liberalization – increased spectrum allocations and more 
competitive markets -- produces such pro-consumer results.  We use simulations to compare the 
net social benefits of liberalization against policies suggested in the auction literature to enhance 
license bids.  We argue that increases in bandwidth and competitiveness produce consumer 
benefits that generally dominate social gains from rent extraction via wireless license auctions. 
      1 
What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design 




  Economists have embraced “spectrum auctions.”
1 A healthy literature on the 
theory and implementation of auctions has emerged, focusing on the efficiency of rival 
bidding mechanisms.
2  The key metric for evaluating policies has been the magnitude of 
winning bids.
3  Revenues raised by government auctions are seen both as indicators of 
auction design efficiency and as transfers that increase social welfare by offsetting similar 
funds raised via activity-distorting taxes, where each dollar raised is expected to cost 
society about $0.33 in deadweight loss (Klemperer 2002b, 179). 
  Yet, competitive spectrum policies typically reduce expected retail prices for 
wireless services, lowering demand for wireless licenses and diminishing auction 
revenues.  Economists (and policy makers) have long been aware of this conflict, and – 
when viewing policy from a high level – are often careful to emphasize the importance of 
spectrum allocation rules that promote competition for end users.  John McMillan, in one 
of the first papers explaining the new wireless license auctions, was careful to note: 
 
The Act [enabling auctions] downplays revenue as an objective, and by its 
actions also the government showed that revenue was not its overriding 
objective (as indeed, it should not be).   If revenue had been paramount, 
the government could have offered a single monopoly license in each 
region – at the cost, obviously, of creating future inefficiencies.   
(McMillan 1994, p.147) 
 
                                                 
1   “Overall, the auctions have been a tremendous success… Many countries wisely imitated the FCC 
auctions; those that have not have suffered from inefficient assignments and other flaws” (Cramton 2002, 
606).   
2   See McMillan 1994, McAfee & McMillan 1996, Cramton 1995, 2002; Spiller & Moreton 1998; Grimm 
et al. 2001; Wolfstetter 2001; Binmore & Klemperer 2002; Van Damme 2002; Klemperer 2002a, 2002b.   
3   While the task of assigning operating permits to the most efficient service providers is commonly cited 
as a basic rationale for auctions, the evaluation of alternative license auction mechanisms has focused on 
differences in revenues.   2 
Similar high-level comments about promoting market competition are evident in many 
important policy statements, including Peter Cramton’s testimony that  
 
Good policy must respect the economic forces of markets. Indeed, policy 
decisions should follow from the simple question: "Does this policy 
promote competition in communication services?" If the answer is yes, I 
am all for it.  (Cramton 2000, p. 8) 
 
But the formal literature on wireless license auctions focuses not on end user 
efficiencies, but on bidding mechanisms, where empirical evaluations are largely 
rendered on the basis of rent extraction.  Auctions resulting in prices exceeding 
expectations are deemed “successful”; those with surprisingly low prices are “fiascoes” 
or “disasters.”  The analytical approach assumes that licenses are assets being sold, and 
that the regulatory process creating such property rights is exogenous to the mechanism 
used to assign the rights.  License rents ‘left on the table’ create social inefficiency, 
sacrificing a possible public financing bonus, costing about one-third of a dollar for each 
dollar uncollected.    
Were auction policies simply transferring rents for the public treasury, then this 
operative assumption would reflect reality.  Yet, rules employed by auctioneers, many of 
which emerge from formal economic analysis, repeatedly cross over the presumed line of 
demarcation, altering efficiency in output markets.  Imposing reserve prices, limiting the 
number of licenses sold, providing bidding credits for weak competitors, or delaying 
license assignments are regulatory policies advanced in response to the “low 
participation” problem encountered auctions.   Economists largely evaluate these 
measures according to their effectiveness in raising bids, ignoring retail market 
consequences.  Exogeneity is breeched; spectrum use rights, and market structure, are 
now materially impacted by auction design. The general conflict between receipts and 
consumer welfare is recognized.  But the social costs of revenue raising devices are, in 
examining specific policies, unaccounted for.   
The inconsistent incorporation of final market welfare effects is illustrated by case 
studies reviewed in the literature.  Klemperer (2002b, 176) discusses an interesting 3 
Turkish mobile phone license auction, wherein the government mandated that the price 
for a second national license equal or exceed that bid by the winner of the first.  That 
prompted the first licensee to bid aggressively, such that a second operator would not pay 
the steep entry fee; the result was monopoly market structure.  Klemperer identifies this 
as “the Turkish fiasco.”   
Alternatively, when reservation prices excluded award of a fourth 3G
4 license in 
2001 auctions held (separately) in Belgium and Greece (only the bids of three incumbents 
met the threshold), the policy is applauded for extracting additional surplus.  The loss of 
competitive entry is discounted as a low-probability event (i.e., Klemperer argues that it 
was not likely a fourth network would have emerged even with a lower reservation 
price), and the productivity loss of leaving allocated 3G spectrum idle (as per the unused 
fourth license in either market) is not incorporated as a social loss. 
  A basic inconsistency arises.  The assumption is made that auctions assign rights 
configured in a distinct policy process, “spectrum allocation” (Cramton 2002, 631).   
Auctions then involve pure rent transfers, and various bidding rules are evaluated with 
respect to how well they extract producers’ surplus.  But many policies offered by 
economists to improve license rent extraction ultimately impact retail markets, violating 
the conceptual separation.  These effects, as in diminished competition resulting from the 
“Turkish fiasco,” are sometimes noted.  In other cases, as with the spectrum left idle in 
Belgium and Greece, they are ignored.  By focusing on revenues generated by license 
auctions, and abstracting from wireless service markets, rules that increase revenues but 
simultaneously inflict collateral damage on consumers are incorrectly evaluated.  In 
essence, auction revenue benefits are accounted for, but not costs. 
  This paper argues that economic analysis of alternative spectrum allocation 
policies, including rules governing license auctions, should encompass final market 
welfare effects.  Efficiencies generated by license auctions would then be evaluated in a 
proper context.  Reservation prices, bidding credits for ‘weak bidders,’ license 
limitations, and other policies would then be analyzed not solely on the basis of 
incremental government receipts, but also with regard to social costs incurred when radio 
                                                 
4   “3G” stands for “third generation” wireless networks, which typically include mobile voice and high-
speed data.  “2G” provided digital voice and low-speed data; “1G” networks supplied analog voice. 4 
frequencies are under-utilized, inefficient suppliers win licenses, or multi-year delays 
block entry.   
  Our methodological argument suggests an important policy focus: regulatory 
changes aimed at increasing auction bids while damaging consumer surplus are likely to 
be penny wise and pound foolish.  This is because license rents reflect only expected 
producers’ surplus, which tends to be dominated in magnitude by consumers’ surplus. 
Consider the U.S. market for wireless phone service.  In 2003, total industry revenues 
were approximately $90 billion (Merrill Lynch 2003).   As a conservative approximation, 
we assume that consumer surplus in this market equals about ninety percent of total 
revenues, or $81 billion annually.
5   
Valuation of wireless telephone licenses is observed in the sale of raw PCS 
(personal communications services) C Block licenses in 2003-04, pursuant to the long 
bankruptcy dispute concerning NextWave.  Current transactions imply that the 
company’s licenses are worth approximately $6.5 billion.
6   Covering areas with 166 
million residents, and being allocated an average 23.5 MHz, implies a value of $1.66 per 
MHz per capita.  Applied to the entire 175 MHz used for wireless telephone service,
7 and 
assuming a U.S. population of 290 million, produces aggregate valuation of $84.4 billion.  
 Hence,  the  capitalization of licenses approximately equals the annual consumer 
surplus. Even a relatively high social discount rate of ten percent suggests about a ten-to-
one differential between Consumers’ Surplus and license rents (a similar ratio, based on 
independent estimates of consumers’ and producers’ surplus, is offered in Rosston 2001).  
This is an essential empirical reality which escapes attention.  Policies are offered to 
intentionally create market power, increasing license rents: “[S]ince alternative taxes 
entail an enormous welfare loss, it is even optimal to accept some deviation from 
                                                 
5   This assumption is actually derived from examination of historical data.  See Appendix 2.  We note that 
Hausman (2002), using alternative empirical techniques, also finds consumer surplus in U.S. wireless 
telephony approximately equal to total revenues. 
6   This is the mid-point of estimates supplied by the WALL STREET JOURNAL, which reported that “the 
company's wireless spectrum, which is valued at between $5.5 billion and $7.5 billion.”  Gregory 
Zuckerman and Geoffrey Drucker, NextWave Spectrum Could Figure In Some Future Telecom Megadeal, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 2, 2004).   
7   The total spectrum allocation consists of 50 MHz for cellular licenses, 120 MHz for PCS licenses, and 
up to 19 MHz for SMR (specialized mobile radio) licenses used by companies like Nextel.  This total of 
189 MHz, however, includes the idle spectrum allocated to Nextwave licenses.  Deducting the weighted 5 
efficiency if this gives rise to more revenue” (Wolfstetter 2001, p. 6).  But because this 
“deviation from efficiency” raises revenue in the input market, while damaging consumer 
surplus in the output market, this strategy faces a stiff burden.  We show that restricting 
the productive use of radio spectrum is, generally, a relatively expensive means to secure 
public funds from the first dollar raised. 
  This paper addresses what is really important in spectrum allocation policy: the 
performance of alternative wireless regulatory regimes in lowering retail prices for 
wireless telephone users.  Our analysis extends previous research (Hazlett & Muñoz 
2004) that empirically evaluates wireless telephone markets in twenty-nine countries, of 
which 18 employ license auctions.  After adjusting for cross-sectional differences in 
demand and supply, we find that operating market efficiency is not improved by 
replacing “beauty contests” with auctions, while it appears strongly benefited by 
increasing the quantity of spectrum available to operators, as well as by increasing levels 
of competition (measured by lower levels of operator concentration).    
  The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the 
emphasis placed on revenue extraction by economists, noting the inconsistent manner in 
which efficiency changes in output markets enter the analysis.  Section III evaluates one 
important argument offered in the literature, which is that policies to maximize efficiency 
in telecommunications markets produce a sub-optimal level of distortion.  Section IV 
outlines the basic analytical approach taken in our empirical analysis, while Section V 
reports econometric evidence and simulations illuminating the relevant policy trade-offs. 
Section VI offers a conclusion.   
 
2. “Successes” And “Fiascoes”   
 
[T]he economic theorists advising the Swiss government on its 3G auction 
favored a multi-unit ascending auction ... [and] also proposed setting a 
high reserve price…  But serious reserve prices are often unpopular with 
politicians and bureaucrats who -- even if they have the information to set 
                                                                                                                                                 
average total for those PCS C block licenses (unused through 2003) produces an upper bound spectrum 
allocation of about 175 MHz.  6 
them sensibly -- are often reluctant to run even a tiny risk of not selling the 




  In the economics literature, wireless license auctions are typically ranked and 
evaluated according to receipts raised.  This metric is sometimes defined in gross 
revenues, revenue per capita, or revenue per MHz per capita (reflecting bandwidth 
allocated to the licenses sold).  Higher bids are considered evidence of superior auction 
design.  Table II.1 shows results for the European 3G auctions. 
  Klemperer (2002a) identifies the British auction as successful, while rating 
auctions in Austria, Netherlands and Switzerland as “fiascoes.”
8  He concludes that the 
circumstances separating successful from unsuccessful license assignments demonstrates 
that: “[A]uction design is not ‘one size fits all.’  The ascending design that worked very 
well for the UK worked very badly in the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland because of 
entry problems, and this was predictable (and predicted) in advance” (2002a, p. 844).   A 
similar appraisal of the Swiss auction is offered by Paul Milgrom, who adds a policy 
prescription: 
 
…Swiss authorities could have achieved a higher price if they had wished.  
The auction rules could have provided that if few bidders entered the 
auction, the government would sell the spectrum in the form of three 
licenses, rather than four, to create meaningful competition (Milgrom 
2004, p. 209). 
 
  Auctions distribute intermediate inputs. Value is only created via the use of radio 
spectrum to provide services to users.  The degree to which licenses enable productive 
use of airwaves is not perfectly correlated with the price of licenses sold, even when the 
competitive bidding process succeeds in extracting the present value of expected profits.  
Klemperer (2002b, 177) notes that “the outcome of an auction is driven by bidders’ 
                                                 
8   The auction in the Netherlands is rated a “miserable failure” in Binmore & Klemperer (2002, C93). 7 
profits, not by the welfare of consumers or society as a whole,” and offers guidance for 
constructing certain pro-competitive outcomes.   But the conflict between efficiency in 
output markets and the maximization of auction revenue is not spelled out.  And the more 
fundamental question of how rival spectrum policies (which include, but are not limited 
to, license assignment methods) affect consumer welfare is not systematically addressed 
in this literature.
9  Output reducing policy conclusions are often reached solely by 
examination of auction bidding. 
  Historically, the adoption of competitive bidding reformed a rent seeking process 
marked by wasteful investments and political favoritism.
10  In any event, secondary 
markets were usually permitted to redistribute licenses.  Allowing the price system to 
select initial licensees afforded clear efficiencies, constrained political discretion, and 
captured license rents for the public treasury.  These revenues may displace tax funds, 
reducing economic distortions. 
  Auctions have been lauded as successful in improving spectrum policy, 
eliminating the time and expense of non-auction assignments (CBO 1997; FCC 1977), 
and raising public funds efficiently (Cramton 2002).  Klemperer (2002b) argues that, 
“Even relatively unsuccessful auctions, such as the Netherlands and Italian spectrum 
auctions, were probably more successful than the ‘beauty contest’ administrative hearings 
used to allocate third-generation spectrum in several other European countries.  For 
example, the Spanish beauty contest yielded just 13 euros per head of population, but 
generated considerable political and legal controversy and a widespread perception that 
the outcome was both unfair and inefficient …”   
  The comparison is performed on results observed in the input market.  While we 
agree that such comparisons are appropriate assuming wireless market outcomes are 
independent of the policies used to extract license rents, this assumption is often violated.  
                                                 
9   There are many treatments of economic efficiency in spectrum policy, but they are largely divorced from 
the auction literature.  See Rosston & Weinberg 1997; Spiller & Cardillo 1999; White 2000; Hazlett 2001; 
Owen & Rosston 2001; Kwerel & Williams 2002; Farber & Faulhaber 2002; Hazlett 2003; Benjamin 2003. 
10   Economic analysis of radio spectrum essentially began with Coase’s 1959 argument for auctions as a 
superior rights assignment tool.  See also, Kwerel & Felker 1985; Hazlett & Michaels 1993; Hazlett 1998.  
One of the authors of this paper participated in the policy debate, writing in favor of auctions (Hazlett, 
Making Money Out of the Air, NEW YORK TIMES [Dec. 2, 1987]; Hazlett, Dial 'G' for Giveaway, BARRON’S 
[June 4, 1990]).   
 8 
Moreover, comparing regimes without evaluating retail price and quantity effects skips 
the essential policy analysis.    
 
Demsetz Auctions 
  Demsetz (1968) proposed an alternative to traditional public utility regulation by 
suggesting that bidding for utility franchises could capture both the productive 
efficiencies of natural monopoly and the allocative efficiencies produced by market 
competition.  The idea focused the monopoly problem, which had been seen as strictly 
one of market structure, on the nature of competition for the market, which led to 
contestability theory (Baumol et al., 1982). 
  The intersection with the license auction question occurs in the Demsetz 
Auction’s bid ranking instrument: retail prices.  Because franchises were assumed to be 
monopolistic, awarding rights to high dollar bidders would capture rents for public use 
but would incur substantial social costs via output restriction.  Hence, the Demsetz 
Auction winner was the firm submitting the lowest price schedule.  A robust franchise 
competition, with the appropriate assumptions, would produce no government revenues, 
but would insure productive and allocative efficiency.   
  This contrasts with wireless licenses sold to high bidders.  Of course, there are 
excellent reasons for abandoning the low retail price bid method, as it requires a complex 
contractual relationship with quality of service guarantees over the contract term.   The 
ability of regulatory institutions to effectively conduct such an auction is questionable.  
For example, local cable TV franchisors in the United States, prior to federal deregulation 
of cable TV rates in 1984, had the legal authority to select franchise operators so as to 
mimic competitive pricing.  Yet, administrative costs, multi-dimensional price schedules, 
and agency problems (incentives of franchise authorities to engage in Posner’s “taxation 
by regulation” rather than promoting purely efficient outcomes) undermined the practical 
success of Demsetz Auctions (Williamson 1976; Hazlett 1990; Beutel 1990). 
  High bids are easier for regulators to interpret, leaving many more determinations 
to markets.  The contrasting regulatory approaches are noted here, however, to illuminate 
the underpinnings of the performance metric popular in evaluating wireless license 
auctions: were institutions capable of regulating contracts defining quality of service, 9 
zero revenues would be the optimal outcome.  Firms would be incented to dissipate rents 
by extending lower prices to consumers, expanding output and increasing economic 
efficiency.  In this vein, optimal spectrum policy will produce competitive market 
conditions that reduce license rents. 
  
Examples of “Cart Before the Horse,” and Vice Versa  
  Specific examples illustrate how license assignment methods are nested in the 
spectrum allocation regime.  Policies with clear output market efficiency implications are 
commonly evaluated solely on the basis of how such reforms alter auction receipts.  This 
is not universally the case; however, some policies inflicting inefficiencies are rejected.  
These latter are sometimes identified as instances in which auction design puts “the cart 
before the horse” (Klemperer 2002b, 185).   
  We agree with this appraisal.  The problem is that such conclusions constitute ad 
hoc departures from license revenue maximization, and leave other instances in which 
“cart before the horse” reasoning is uncontested. The approach begs the question as to 
why efficiency in the provision of wireless services is only occasionally relevant.  The 
following arguments underscore the general confusion.  
  A general example would be the consensus approach taken with respect to the 
“low participation” problem, which Paul Milgrom explains thusly: 
 
When the likely winner of an auction is not in much doubt, the prospect of 
incurring unrecoverable costs can depress entry.  Spectrum auctions in 
Germany, Italy, Israel, and Switzerland have all suffered from insufficient 
entry… [W]e show how a seller can structure an auction to encourage 
entry, increase competition, and promote high prices (Milgrom 2004, p. 
234). 
 
  Suggested policy remedies include reserve prices, bidding credits, and 
withholding licenses, each of which are evaluated below.  Of note here is that the 
problem economists determine to solve is that excess demand for licenses is insufficiently 
intense.  But if license auctions are seen as a means to end – enabling productive use of 10 
airwaves – “low participation” makes rights distribution easier to achieve; there is no 
problem to solve.  This is not the perspective of a private party selling a valuable asset, 
but of the government facilitating efficient marketplace transactions so as to maximize 
consumer welfare.  Promoting measures to generate excess demand for licenses then puts 
the “cart before the horse,” misdirecting attention. 
 
First Price vs. Ascending Price auctions  
  Klemperer establishes that a simple ascending auction is not an efficient 
assignment tool due to problems related to collusion and entry deterrence:  
 
In an ascending auction, there is a strong presumption that the firm that values 
winning the most will be the eventual winner, because even if it is outbid at an 
early stage, it can eventually top any opposition. As a result, other firms have 
little incentive to enter the bidding and may not do so if they have even modest 
costs of bidding (Klemperer 2002b, 172).    
 
  Klemperer’s solution to the problems associated with the ascending auction 
format is to make it more robust to collusion and entry deterring behavior. This is 
achieved with the Anglo-Dutch design (Klemperer 2002b) or by using a first price 
sealed-bid auction.  This will likely generate higher revenues for the auctioneer, and 
evidence from actual wireless telephone license auctions suggest that first-price sealed 
bids generally exceed other winning bids by a statistically significant amount (Hazlett 
2004).  Yet, there are expected costs to such an auction design which include an 
increased probability that a “weak” player will out-bid a “strong” one, displacing an 
eventually more efficient rival.  Where this happens, higher supply costs will offset, to 
some degree, economies gained by more efficient rent extraction in the license auction.   
  Our point is not to argue against first-price sealed bids, or to dispute the 
conclusion that these auctions raise higher revenues (which we have previously found to 
be the case).  Rather, we stress inclusion of welfare considerations whenever input or 
output markets are impacted by regulatory changes, and note the exclusion of efficiency 
trade-offs from the auction method discussion here.  The social losses associated with 11 
auction rules designed to encourage participation by weak bidders are particularly 
pronounced in the U.S. PCS C block auctions, discussed below.  
 
Roaming resale mandated for UK wireless operators  
  To attract additional 3G auction bidders, Binmore & Klemperer (2002, C80-81) 
note that it was useful to impose obligations on incumbents in the United Kingdom such 
that new wireless networks could route “roaming” traffic over existing (2G) wireless 
networks at regulated rates.  This is seen to have mitigated initial scale advantages 
enjoyed by incumbents, encouraging de novo entrants to participate in the auctions, 
raising bids.
11
    The regulatory mandate may be an efficiency-enhancing rule, but its net social 
value is not entirely determined by its effect on auction revenues.  To take a polar case, 
assume that regulators, in issuing just one new license, set wholesale access rules such 
that the new wireless licensee was entitled to use all existing facilities without charge.  
Bids for the new license would predictably increase, as the rules transfer incumbents’ 
property to the entrant.  The appropriation of incumbents, however, has implications for 
efficiency, particularly in relation to the rationing of existing capacity and financial 
incentives to invest in new infrastructure.  Such policies should be evaluated not simply 
on license rents extracted, but on market outcomes which ensue.   
 
Reserve Prices  
  The sequential Turkish auctions, which mandated that the price for the second 
license equal or exceed that bid by the winner of the first, prompted the first licensee to 
bid so aggressively that a second operator would not pay the steep entry fee. Klemperer 
appropriately labels the monopoly output market result “the Turkish fiasco.”  
  Yet, the inefficient result is the potential outcome of reservation prices generally.  
When licenses remain unsold, less market competition is likely to result and typically, the 
bandwidth allocated to unsold licenses remains idle.  But reserve prices are ubiquitously 
                                                 
 
11   Indeed, further regulatory obligations on incumbents were requested by consulting economists, but 
denied by regulators.  These measures included full resale requirements and bidding credits.   12 
advocated.
12  They are specifically advanced as a mechanism allowing the government 
“to withhold supply and set reserve prices to improve revenues” (Ausubel & Cramton 
1999, p. 12).  The higher prices that are expected to ensue from this policy are not 
incorporated into the analysis.  Below, we evaluate the costs of leaving licenses unsold 
due to reserve prices imposed on auctions in Belgium and Greece.  
  It is also illustrative that the remedy to the “Turkish fiasco” attempted by Turkish 
policy makers was not well received in the economics literature.  When the government 
moved to moot the monopoly by issuing an additional license, lowering the reservation 
price ex post, the policy shift brought this challenge:  “The credibility of reserve prices is 
of special importance;” whatever the social gains, they are achieved by the government  
“at what cost to the credibility of its future auctions?” (Klemperer 2002b, 177).   
  Pro-competitive actions by government are here seen as opportunistic behavior.  
Indeed, lack of credible long-term commitments to anticompetitive market structure 
would solve the very problem identified as a “fiasco.”  If bidders for License No. 1 did 
not trust government commitments to exclude entry via License No. 2 based on its 
announced reservation price rule, then demand for License 1 would have fallen such that 
entry via License 2 was not deterred.
13  The “fiasco” would have been averted. 
 
Bidding credits as a “free lunch” 
Another solution to the “low participation” problem that has gained currency 
among economists is the use of bidding credits:  
 
The government could allow any firm to bid on any license, but give the 
designated firms a price preference.  With a preference of, say, 10 percent, 
a designated firm would win if its bid was no more than 10 percent less 
than the highest nondesignated-firm bid.  This is a free-lunch policy.  It 
would not only address the public-policy goal of increasing the number of 
                                                 
12 See McMillan (1994, p. 159); Klemperer (2002b, pp. 176, 178).. 
13 While government reneging may create spillovers that raise transaction costs, reducing the credibility of 
anti-competitive rights is a productive outcome if it lowers the incidence of monopoly creation.  Moreover, 
spillover reneging costs could most economically be reduced not by maintaining monopoly market 
structure, but by compensating the “good faith” monopoly license winner, presumably by refunding some 
or all monies bid.  Rent extraction again diverts attention from economic efficiency.   13 
licenses won by the designated firms, but it would also actually increase 
the government’s revenue (McMillan 1994, 158). 
 
This approach received a boost after initial use of credits by the FCC appeared to 
yield additional revenues (Ayres & Cramton 1996).  The “free lunch,” however, comes 
with obvious economic costs: less efficient suppliers tend to win licenses.  This undercuts 
the basic motivation for license auction adoption, which is that competitive bidding is 
superior to government ‘beauty contests’ or to random allocations (as in lottery 
assignments) in awarding operating rights to those firms that can most efficiently provide 
service to the public.  Milgrom argues against the view that secondary markets will fully 
correct for inefficiency in initial awards:  “According to a famous result in mechanism 
design theory – the Meyerson-Satherwaite theorem – there is no way to design a 
bargaining protocol that avoids this problem: delays or failures are inevitable in private 
bargaining if the good starts out in the wrong hands” (Milgrom 2004, 21).   
Yet bidding credits are evaluated with respect to their revenue raising potential in 
license auctions.  The social costs of moving away from market-based awards are 
considered exogenous.  And while observed revenue increases in license auctions have 
often been advanced to support the use of bidding credits, the enormous social costs of 
the U.S. PCS C block fiasco have not systematically entered the cost-benefit calculus.  In 
this instance, small businesses and rural phone companies were extended bidding credits 
and long-term low-interest loans; the result was widespread over-bidding followed by 
licensee bankruptcies, following which no use was made of the allocated spectrum while 
court battles (which the government largely lost) played out (Hazlett & Boliek 1999; 
Wilkie 2004).   
Below we show that the social losses resulting removing a 30 MHz block of 
nationwide bandwidth from productive use for a decade far surpasses any plausible 
efficiencies associated with rent extraction due to enhanced auction bids.  That much of 
the U.S. experience is attributed to poorly devised terms in implementing the bidding 
credit is true, and largely irrelevant.  Given that credits increase weak bidders’ chances of 
winning licenses, social costs are expected.  These costs are properly accounted for in an 
optimal spectrum policy.  14 
The Italian 3G Auction  
  Making market structure less competitive has been rejected by economists critical 
of the Italian 3G auction design.  Klemperer (2002b, 185) writes that the Italian 
government “stipulated that if there were no more ‘serious’ bidders than licenses, then the 
number of licenses could, and probably would, be reduced.” Klemperer pronounces this 
policy “fundamentally flawed…it is putting the cart before the horse to create an 
unnecessarily concentrated mobile-phone market to make an auction look good” (p. 185).  
We join this departure from revenue-maximization.   
 
The UK Auction Delay 
  Huge costs have historically been imposed on consumers and businesses by 
deterring competitive entry or new technologies.  It has been estimated that impeding 
cellular telephone service by a decade, for instance, cost the U.S. economy about $86 
billion in lost productivity.
14  Given that a decade of license auctions have produced 
about $14 billion in actual receipts for the U.S. Treasury,
15 this single spectrum policy 
inefficiency is likely to have cost society about twenty times the claimed public finance 
efficiencies (assuming $0.33 of lost productivity averted for every public dollar gained).
16  
    When delays are a by-product of auction design, their costs are properly weighed 
in calculated net benefits.  Yet economists commonly fail to do so.  In the British 3G 
auction, Binmore & Klemperer (2002, C90) note that a three year planning phase was 
used to good cause, improving the policies adopted, but the analysis does not consider the 
loss in service to the public constituted by the waiting period.
17   Our simulation, 
summarized below (see Section VII.2) suggests that the cost to the U.K. economy of this 
three-year delay was approximately $9.2 billion, or nearly one-third the dollar value 
raised in the U.K. 3G auctions.  Assuming social savings of $0.33 per dollar raised, this 
                                                 
14  Jackson et al. (1991). 
15  Federal Communications Commission, “The Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, Appendix, Federal 
Communications Commission, Status of Direct Loans,” p. 1122.  The aggregate refers to nominal revenues 
during the period 1994 – 2002, inclusive. 
16   Hazlett (2001, 375-402) describes a long list of wireless technologies delayed or deterred by spectrum 
allocation policies in a section entitled, “Silence of the Entrants.” 
17   Similarly, Van Damme (2002, 5) notes that the Netherlands allocated spectrum for 2G licenses in 
March 1995, but did not assign such licenses until February 1998, implying that the delay resulted from 
consideration of the decision to use competitive bidding.   15 
time factor offsets virtually the entire public finance dividend including whatever 
increment was accounted for by the three-year planning process.   
 
The US 3G Delay 
  The three year 3G auction delay in the UK constitutes rapid progress, however, 
compared to 3G licensing in the United States.  Reallocation of UHF-TV spectrum from 
channels 60-69 was proposed by FCC Chairman Reed Hundt in 1996, and licenses were 
ready for auction in 2000.  After eight auction postponements,
18 the bandwidth continues 
to be unavailable for 3G in 2004.  Economists focusing narrowly on auction rules have 
joined those advocating delays,
19 while policy makers have tended to ignore consumer 
losses.  In its first spectrum policy initiative, the Bush Administration prepared a March 
2001 budget statement that recommended that 3G auctions be delayed until September 
2004, calling this "a 'win-win' for all parties involved...and it's good telecom policy."
20  
The ‘win-win’ referred to higher government receipts (as bids were expected to increase 
over time), and incumbent carriers gaining their request that new industry capacity be 
delayed.  Only consumer interests were omitted from the ‘win-win’ analysis.
21   
 
The Indian Case 
  The Indian Department of Telecommunications (DoT) divided the country in 19 
“circles,” plus 4 metropolitan service areas, allocating two cellular licenses and one 
Wireless Local Loop (WLL) license in each.  The DoT mandated that mobile licensees 
                                                 
18   Hazlett (2001, 466) shows how the argument that the unoccupied spectrum should be preserved to 
deliver HDTV, at some unspecified date in the future, has been used to delay or block new services.  
19   Ronald Harstad, Aleksandr Pekec, and Michael Rothkopf filed a Comment with the Federal 
Communications Commission in January 2001, “Verizon is Right: Delay Auction No. 31.”  The authors 
filed another Comment on February 19, 2002, “Thorough Analysis of Package Bidding Procedures is Still 
Needed,” which urged further delay for Auction No. 31.  The licenses in this auction are allocated UHF-TV 
spectrum targeted for reallocation from television to wireless telecommunications (3G). As Hazlett (2001, 
467) has pointed out, no station would go off the air under the reallocation plan proposed by then-Chairman 
Hundt, but merely shift to a different (lower) frequency.  Hence, lack of reallocation has simply wasted 
spectrum capacity. As of July 2004, the licenses are yet unallocated.  No mention of this productivity loss is 
made in the Harstad et al. filings, which focus solely on the possibility that rent extraction may be less than 
full under some auction designs. 
20   Thomas W. Hazlett, Hostage Standoff, BARRON’S (March 19, 2001). 
21   In the interests of reduction ad absurdum, we abstract from the numerous other social interests harmed 
by the intentional policy of delay.  Among these are telecommunications equipment manufacturers 
(shareholders and employees); U.S. businesses using wireless communications as inputs; public safety 
organizations which rely, in part, on public wireless networks. 16 
use GSM technology,
22 while for basic services, “a combination of fiber optic and 
wireless in the local loop [WLL] was selected” (Jain 2001, p. 673).    
  Licenses were auctioned beginning in 1991.  In the cellular auction, bids were 
taken for annual license fees; competing bids were ranked according to the net present 
value of the promised payment stream.   Two bidders were assigned licenses, with the 
second highest bidder also paying the top bid to receive the license (Jain 2001).
  Following license auctions, network build-out and subscriber take-up were slow. 
Legal skirmishing ensued.  In August, 1999, the National Telecom Policy revamped the 
system.   In a compromise, operators dropped lawsuits against the regulatory authority, 
while the government agreed to reform license fees.  Fixed annual payments were 
eliminated (i.e., rebated) in favor of (a) a one-time fee, and (b) an ongoing share of 
revenue.    This share was established by statute, equaling  12% of "Adjusted Gross 
Revenue" (AGR) for Metro Service Areas and category `A' circles, 10% of AGR for 
category `B' Circles, and 8% of AGR for category `C' Circles.   
  In addition, the number of licensed operators per market was increased.  On 
January 25, 2001 the DoT allowed WLL licensees to provide local area mobility to 
customers within so-called SDCAs (Short Distance Charging Area).  The Cellular Mobile 
Services Providers (CMSPs), representing mobile incumbents, disputed this ruling, but it 
was resolved in favor of the entrants by an August 8, 2003 Supreme Court ruling.  An 
additional nationwide CMSP operator was licensed in 2002.  
  From the standpoint of efficient rent extraction, the performance of India’s policy 
makers might be judged as poor.  Not only have regulators undone commitments made 
by bidders, they have switched from fixed payments to revenue sharing, imposing 
marginal taxes that presumably distort economic behavior.  Yet, following the spectrum 
reforms, market penetration and competitiveness clearly increased.  As Merrill Lynch 
observed in its 2003-2Q assessment of the wireless phone sectors in 46 countries: 
 
India: Subscriber growth accelerated to 132% YoY [year on year], making 
it the fastest growing wireless market in the world… [W]e estimate that 
MOU [minutes of use] rose 50% and RPM [revenue per minute] dropped 
                                                 
22   GSM is a digital wireless telephone standard, competing largely today against a rival, CDMA. 17 
56% YoY due to free incoming calling.  At $0.04, India’s RPM is the 
lowest in the world (Merrill Lynch 2003, p. 37). 
 
  How should economists evaluate Indian spectrum policy?  The economic case for 
substituting lump sum taxes for levies that increase marginal costs is well known.  Yet, 
the goals sought by Indian regulators – faster network deployments and lower service 
prices – produce efficiency gains, and policy shifts were undertaken which appear to have 
achieved announced goals.  The trade-offs deserve serious scrutiny.   
 
Summary 
  The social costs of wireless license auction rules, and the regulatory process in 
which they are formed and implemented, consistently evaluated.  The result is that 
economic analysis of spectrum allocation policies often achieves less than it might.  We 
argue that economists should focus on the impact of regulatory decisions on output 
markets.  Efficiency gains from auction revenues constitute only a very limited part of 
this analysis.    
 
3. Increasing License Scarcity to Extract Incremental Revenue 
 
  One line of argument in the economics literature deserves special comment.  The 
policy recommendation has developed that, “just as a competitive telecommunications 
market contributes to… welfare, so might high auction revenue, and therefore both 
objectives should be considered” (van Damme 2002, 6).  Hence, some seek to balance the 
social gains from higher license revenues against the costs of supra-competitive pricing 
resulting from the imposition of suboptimal market structure.  “[S]ince alternative taxes 
entail an enormous welfare loss, it is even optimal to accept some deviation from 
efficiency if this gives rise to more revenue” (Wolfstetter 2001, 6).  A similar argument is 
made in Rothkopf & Harstad (2003). 
  This logic has recently been developed into a policy proposal by Rothkopf & 
Bazelon (2003), which attempts to extract rents from wireless licensees whose rights are 
expanded via liberalization.  Suppose, for instance, that a cellular phone operator is 18 
licensed to deliver analog service, but is then awarded the option to use digital 
technology.  The enhanced discretion is, economically speaking, a property right, and that 
right may confer a windfall gain on the licensee.
23   
  Rothkopf & Bazelon are critical of a “big bang” proposal by FCC policy analysts 
(Kwerel & Williams 2002) allowing licensees to use frequencies allocated their licenses 
in ways not specified in their licenses.  This would “distribute expanded use rights to 
incumbents for free or at far below their value” (Rothkopf & Bazelon, 4).  Rejecting the 
“approach to spectrum management that focuses solely on the efficiency gains associated 
with distributing the expanded and valuable license rights (Ibid.),” they devise a way to 
extract value from incumbents granted new flexibility.   
  The problem with simply auctioning the new rights is that the incumbents will 
clearly be the highest bidders.  Entry into the auction will be lackluster (given fixed costs 
of participating), and serious bidding rarer still, given the expectation that license rights 
are worth far more to current networks than to newcomers.   
  This foreordained outcome might be seen as an opportunity to save resources by 
assigning rights to incumbents without an auction, a transaction cost minimizing strategy 
suggested by the Coase Theorem (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1972).  Yet, if this approach 
squanders rents, then social costs may be borne (i.e., monies that could be raised by 
license auctions will instead be raised by activity-distorting levies).  It is this latter 
consideration that motivates the policy proposal. 
  To extract revenues from incumbents receiving new rights, Rothkopf & Bazelon 
(R&B) advocate that the regulatory authority withhold some portion of new rights from 
the market, pitting incumbents against each other in bidding for a reduced number of 
“windfall rights.”  Say that there are 100 analog cellular phone carriers in 100 (or fewer) 
markets, and each could profitably deploy digital technology that is prohibited by current 
license restrictions.  Instead of awarding 100 digital transmission rights, DR, a lesser 
number would be issued, DR<100, with incumbents forced to bid.  The equilibrium price 
would equalize bidders (buyers) and licenses.  In general, the lower the government sets 
                                                 
23   Rothkopf & Bazelon assert that expanded rights will unambiguously bestow a “giveaway” (2003, 3).  
Yet, additional rights distributed to a class of licensees may reduce rents associated with exclusivity.   
Evidence from mobile phone license auctions reveals that rents are actually lower in countries awarding 
extensive property rights to licensees.  See Hazlett 2004. 19 
the number, the higher the extraction per license.  While the R&B proposal provides that 
rights would be released over time, policies to slow assignments would attract bids from 
those service providers demanding faster access to spectrum.  “The proposal… would 
gradually make spectrum available on a property-rights-like basis (Ibid., 7).”   
“Gradually,” as opposed to all at once, in a “big bang.” 
  The rights withheld are valuable to the degree they improve the efficiency of 
wireless services; incremental revenues are captured by imposing a loss of efficiency.  
The magnitude of that social cost, ignored in the R&B proposal, dominates plausible 
social gains from rent extraction.  In fact, if we consider a base case with two markets,
24 
the first auction dollar raised will exceed $1 in additional social cost, and will likely 
exceed it by at least an order of magnitude.  We establish this via a simple graphical 
proof. 
  In Figure III.1, the basic problem is set forth.  An incumbent in Market A, Firm 
A
I, seeks additional rights.  The policy issue is how to award that one new right.
25  The 
demand curve for such rights dominates the demand expressed by a potential entrant, 
Firm A
E.  Hence, if an auction were to award one additional right, the price would be bid 
to just about  .  This leaves rents = [ ]  = WF, a windfall to the incumbent.  This 
drives the R&B solution, which is to eliminate a license award in another market, Market 
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  Now the incumbent in Market A is not bidding against the entrant in Market A, 
but against the incumbent in Market B.  The incumbent in A must bid higher to gain the 
one new right, as competition for that right is made more intense.  Instead of paying 
about  ,  t h e  F i r m  A
E
A P
E must pay about  .  The windfall to A
I
B P
I diminishes, with increased 
rents going to the government.  If we assume that incremental revenue [ ] = $1, 
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24   The argument also apply if we consider the number of licenses equal to a half of the number of markets 
and there are two types of markets, A and B, in equal quantities.  
25   We here assume that wireless license rights are generic and easily defined.  Hence, a continuous 
demand for these rights is postulated.  In fact, this is a very favorable assumption for the R&B proposal.  
We also assume that the spectrum allocation process is unaffected, meaning that the same number of 
productive rights is released by regulators when incumbents receive windfalls as when they do not.  This is, 
again, highly favorable to the proposal.  We relax these assumptions below. 20 
  This is where the proposal concludes, omitting consideration of the loss imposed 
on Firm B
I = $1 + .  By excluding the marginal rights claimant, a social loss exceeding 
the revenue gained from the first incremental revenue dollar. 
E
A P
  But this counts only the loss of producers’ surplus associated with the elimination 
of the new right in Market B.  Consumers’ surplus in Output Market B (not shown in the 
graph, which characterizes license input demand) is additionally lost by withholding new 
rights.  As explained above, consumers’ surplus likely exceeds surplus extracted in 
license bids by at least one order of magnitude.  The cost-benefit balance tips decidedly 
against the withholding of spectrum rights over any interval.  This demonstrates the loss 
of social efficiency that can result when license revenue extraction is the sole focus of 
economic analysis. 
  In the case when there are N>2 markets and N1<N licenses are auctioned, the 
comparison is less clear. Suppose that N-1 licenses will be auctioned so that just one 
incumbent will be deprived of the new right (i.e., N – N1 = 1).  The market with lowest 
private valuation becomes the relevant margin, setting the license price.  Calling Ai the 
“winning markets” and B the excluded one as before, the R&B mechanism implies the 
following necessary (but insufficient) condition for efficiency: 
 


















where   represents the present value of consumer surplus lost in Market B.  We 
above demonstrated that a conservative estimate for this term, using data from the 
wireless telephone market, is around 10( ). The inequality represents the case when the 
exclusion of market B is compensated by the social payoff of a less distorting revenue 
collection mechanism. 
) ( B CS PV
I
B P
  It is not impossible for this inequality to be satisfied, but it is exceedingly 
difficult.  First, to escape the relatively high value of consumers’ surplus to producers’ 
surplus, many licenses must be auctioned for each license withheld.  In the limit, this 
converges with the liberal solution – maximize market competition, worry not about 
license extractions (Rosston et al., 2001).  But as the A/B ratio increases (i.e., the 21 
proportion of withheld licenses shrinks), downward sloping demand curves reduce the 
magnitude of rent extraction.   
  Second, such rights are highly idiosyncratic. There are an infinite number of 
“flexible” rights, but they do not exist in inventory.  Only when applicants petition for 
permission to change license terms do these additional rights become visible to the 
regulator.  Moreover, the rights are not scarce: Firm A can convert to digital technology 
and not take away any other operator’s opportunity to do the same.  How the regulator 
can define such rights across markets, aiming to price the issuance of some by 
withholding the issuance of others, is problematic. 
  Which prompts the third problem, spectrum allocation dynamics.  As noted, new 
technologies are not administratively discovered.  Rather, incumbent licensees, entrants, 
and technology suppliers invest to create innovative networks and applications.   
Regulatory permission to deploy such constitutes a barrier to entry; the more effective is 
the system in appropriating innovators’ gains, the lower the investment in such activity.  
Traditionally, spectrum allocation rigidities have imposed high barriers to innovation, 
long the subject of normative criticism by economists (Rosston et al., 2001), and a system 
that has been described as a cartel enforcement device (Hazlett 1990, 1997).  
  Imposing a tax on licensees who seek to obtain new rights depresses incentives 
for innovation as do regulatory rigidities.  Efficient rent-seeking, as when entrepreneurs 
compete to negotiate the regulatory path to offer productive alternatives to consumers, is 
undermined by extracting rents incenting such behavior.  If license bids were pure 
transfers, eliminating this rent-seeking could generate public financing benefits without 
offsetting costs.  But where such extractions decrease entry into new markets or the 
creation of new technologies, this one-sided calculation misrepresents the social 
accounting.  Regulators themselves have noted this dilemma, and attempted various 
structural approaches to mitigate it, such as zero-priced license awards for innovative 
applicants requesting new rights.
26  And incumbents seize upon it regularly, offering 
                                                 
26   Often unsuccessfully, as seen in the failure of the “pioneer’s preference” in the United States (FCC 
1995). 22 
equity arguments to fend off entrants attempting to obtain expanded rights without 
competitive bidding.
27   
 
4. A Regulatory Optimum
 
  In this section we discuss optimal regulatory policy assuming an FCC-type 
spectrum allocation regime.  Assume that the regulator pursues policies to maximize 
social welfare, and that we focus our analysis on the market for wireless telephone 
service.  We summarize this goal in the following objectives: 
 
•  Allocate spectrum to promote the most efficient delivery of wireless services; 
•  Select a mechanism to assign licenses that maximizes social value; 
•  Subject to these constraints, distribute licenses so as to maximize the present 
value of payments to the government. 
 
  The first goal concerns decisions made before licenses are assigned; indeed, it 
encompasses the procedure wherein licenses are created.  Here, the regulator constructs a 
bundle of rights to assign to private parties, and establishes rules shaping industry 
structure and performance, thus determining expected license rents.     
  A less concentrated market structure tends to increase price competition.  Yet, 
scale and/or scope economies may exist, and dynamic (Schumpeterian) efficiencies may 
be improved where relatively efficient firms increase market share.  At a general level, 
fixed and variable costs tend to increase when the amount of spectrum assigned to a 
license is reduced, as happens when additional licenses share a given allocation of 
bandwidth.  Given the costs and benefits of market concentration, our hypothetical 
regulator designs policies to produce an optimal market structure.  
  The second goal is to assign licenses such that total welfare is maximized.  As van 
Damme (2002) comments, this concept, “market efficiency,” is different from “value 
                                                 
27   For instance, this report relates the reaction by wireless telephone companies when some firms licensed 
to provide satellite services requested permission to flexibly use allocated airspace: “Terrestrial interests 
have already asked that satellite companies be subject to the same rules as they are, meaning auctions for 23 
efficiency,” where licenses go to the players who value them the most.  To van Damme, 
“bidders are guided by shareholder value and not by consumer surplus, or total welfare.  
Hence, at best one can expect an auction to produce an allocation that is ‘value efficient,’ 
it need not be ‘market efficient’” (Ibid., p.7).   Market efficiency might, for example, be 
improved by auction rules discriminating against an incumbent to improve post-auction 
market structure (see Gilbert & Newbery 1988 for an excellent discussion of preemptive 
patenting, directly applicable here). We note that this policy would be distinct from the 
“designated entity” policy to subsidize certain bidders in U.S. license auctions, in that the 
discrimination is targeted to expand efficiency in the output market instead of increasing 
revenues.  
  The third goal focuses on raising revenues for public use.   Our assumptions 
isolate this process to one of pure rent transfer.  In this context, higher revenues are 
unambiguously preferred to lower revenues.  In actual policy making, however, the 
assumption is a strong one.  It is violated when incremental revenues are extracted by 
withholding productive rights (see discussion in Section III). 
  It is worth noting that license auctions are at best independent of the first goal,
28 
are useful tools for the second, and are primary mechanisms used to achieve the third.  
These distinctions are important.  We will argue that the first goal is by far the most 
important one in terms of its impact on social welfare.  This policy defines the amount of 
spectrum available in the market to provide services and heavily influences final market 
structure by, among other things, defining the number of available licenses.   
  The main (final) goal of auction design is to select the most efficient providers. 
Under the assumption of value efficiency, the selection of the most efficient providers 
does not conflict with the third goal: maximum revenues for the auctioneer.  In this sense, 
high revenues have been interpreted as a signal of a well designed auction processes in 
the selection of the most efficient providers and as a direct measure of success in the 
achievement of our third goal.  
                                                                                                                                                 
spectrum and strict enforcement of service obligations.”  Greg Lucas, Satellite Spectrum Goes Terrestrial, 
The Orbiter (Dec. 2001), http://www.sspi.org/orbiter/Dec-Jan01/views2.html.  
28    The auction design can reduce the amount of spectrum released to the market as the first policy goal 
(throughout the use of devices aimed to maximize revenues that increase the probability of leaving 
spectrum unoccupied) but it can not expand it. 
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  In what follows we focus on the determinants of social welfare in wireless 
telephone service markets. We investigate regulatory policies under the assumption that 
the goal is to minimize final prices to consumers, where the role of license auctions is to 
transparently select the most efficient providers.  While prices are lower to consumers 
where consumers’ tax burdens are reduced (by license auctions), we show that 
efficiencies associated with the efficient collection of revenues via license auctions is 
generally of second order importance relative to releasing radio spectrum for the 




An Econometric Model      
  In previous research, we have estimated an econometric model to investigate 
influences on retail prices and customer usage in international wireless telephone markets 
(Hazlett & Muñoz, 2004).  The data are reported quarterly, 1999-I through 2003-II, in 29 
countries (Merrill Lynch, 2003).   
  The empirical estimation is straightforward.  We construct a model using demand 
and mark-up equations to predict the price of wireless telephone service (measured in 
revenue per minute of use, or “RPM”).  The mark-up is the relative difference between 
retail price and marginal cost.  The market is modeled as a Cournot equilibrium.  To 
adjust for simultaneity, we employ an instrument for quantity (defined as minutes of 
wireless use), resulting in three estimated equations.  The variables are described in Table 
V.1, results are given in Table V.2, and the data are explained in Appendix 1.   
  The mark-up and instrument equations provide the most important results.  Retail 
prices increase with industry concentration (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshmann 
Index applied to mobile voice service revenues), but decrease with the bandwidth 
allocated to licensees.  Quantities correspondingly move in the opposite direction.  These 
results are statistically significant and are consistent with economic theory.  It is expected 
that more competitive markets feature lower consumer prices, while expanded 
availability of radio spectrum lowers both fixed costs (to construct networks) and variable 
operating expenses  The latter work to directly lower prices. A reduction in fixed costs 25 
lowers prices indirectly, by encouraging entry, potentially increasing competitiveness.  In 
fact, the HHI declines by a statistically significant increment as Spectrum increases.   
   An additional result is noteworthy.  The relationship between license auctions, 
represented by a dummy, and retail prices is positive and statistically significant.  This 
suggests that mobile subscribers in countries assigning wireless licenses via competitive 
bidding tend to pay more for service than customers in similar markets using beauty 
contests.  This is a provocative result, but it is inconsistent with the additional estimation 
that usage is not lower in license auction countries.  We conclude, therefore, that the 





  To analyze the predicted relationship between allocated spectrum and price per 
minute, we perform simulations using the model reported in Table V.1.  Fixing all other 
exogenous variables in logs at their mean values, we then vary the quantity of spectrum 
(in MHz) allotted to the mobile telephony sector.  The estimated parameters derived in 
the econometric model are then used to predict the effect on price and output, permitting 
social welfare changes to be calculated. 
Figure V.1 displays results.  Retail price is decreasing in the amount of allocated 
spectrum, with the rate of decrease declining.  Retail prices are reduced both because 
costs are lower with more abundant inputs, and because more operators are found in 
markets with higher spectrum allocations.  This relationship has important implications 
for spectrum allocation policy, including the design of license auctions.  
 
Welfare Effect 
  A related issue concerns the social welfare effects resulting from additional 
spectrum allocations.  We perform simulations using the model in Table V.1 to address 
this.  We simulate a “country like” scenario, setting variable values to levels found in a 
particular country, to predict the impact on consumer and producer surplus related to an 26 
exogenous increase in licensed spectrum allocated in 20, 80, 140 and 200 MHz 
increments. 
  Expanded spectrum availability is negatively related to market concentration 
(HHI). In order to incorporate this effect, we performed a log-log regression between the 
HHI and all the exogenous variables identified in Table V.1.  The resulting estimated of 
the HHI-Spectrum elasticity was -0.124, significant at the one percent level.  We use this 
elasticity to modify the HHI according to the assumed Spectrum increase.  The 
simulation proceeds as follows. 
 
1.  Initial values are assumed for the exogenous variables, creating “country like” 
scenarios.  Using our model’s parameter estimates, the instrument is calculated; the 
mark-up equation then yields the expected RPM in the benchmark case. 
 
2.  An increase in Spectrum is assumed, say 80 MHz, the corresponding HHI is 
obtained through the HHI-Spectrum elasticity, and the model is used to predict the 
new RPM.  From the percentage change in RPM and the demand elasticity at the 
initial level of output (total minutes), we then estimate the change in output.  
 
3.  Given changes in prices and outputs, we calculate the expected monthly change in 
Consumer Surplus and Producers’ Surplus.  (Producers’ Surplus is calculated on the 
strong assumption that there are no incremental costs for additional minutes of use, 
including all revenue increases as profits.)  We then estimate net present values 
treating these flows as perpetuities, discounting at a rate of 5% per annum.
29   
 
  Table V.2 and Figures V.2 to V.4 show the results for three simulations 
approximating conditions found in a country like the U.K. in 2000-I (just before 3G 
auctions were held), or in Chile in 2003-II (most recent period in the dataset) or the 
United States in 2003-II.  In the U.K. simulation, the increase in producers’ revenues 
reaches a maximum around 140 MHz (coincidentally, just the amount allocated to 27 
auction 3G licenses in Britain).  The social gain from revenues collected by the 
Government is estimated to be one third of auction receipts, which are bounded by 
Producers’ Revenues.  Here, the public financing dividend is estimated to equal $5.7 
billion.  
  This predicted value is about one-half the $11 billion gain realized in the actual 
UK 3G auctions, again assuming a ratio of 1:3 (social costs to revenues).  It may not be 
surprising that the model under-predicts revenues from “the biggest auction ever,” 
Binmore & Klemperer (2002).  Of interest here, however, is that either value is much 
smaller than the estimated $60 billion in consumer surplus generated by increased 
availability of radio spectrum.  Even in the most lucrative license sale to date, productive 
use of radio spectrum is quantitatively much more important to social welfare. 
  The second simulation presents a Chile-like scenario. This would be more 
representative of a non-auction country with significantly lower economic development 
than in the first simulation, yet the effect of additional spectrum is very similar.   
Maximum Revenues are obtained with an allocation of about 80 MHz over the initial 
allocation of 140 MHz.  Social value, however, continues increasing through an 
increment of 200 MHz of additional licensed bandwidth. According to this simulation, if 
the Chilean government decided to auction new licenses allocated 80 MHz, it could 
expect revenues of no more than about $1.1 billion.  Consumers, however, would enjoy 
welfare increases of at least $3.6 billion. 
  Finally, the USA scenario shows that even with an increase in spectrum of just 20 
MHz consumer surplus increases sharply – about $159 billion in present value.  This 
occurs, in part, because the U.S currently allocates far less bandwidth to wireless 
licensees than do other countries of similar income.  See Figure V-2.  The relative lack of 
spectrum access, combined with the powerfully positive impact on social welfare from 
incremental allocations, implies that the policy gains from liberalization (productive use 
of greater bandwidth) will tend to dominate alternative policy margins (such as 
improving license auction revenues) even more in the United States than elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                                                 
29   This can be thought of as a real social discount rate.  Since growth is expected for many years in 
wireless phone markets, it is not implausible that even if the (gross) discount rate much above this level, 
that a net discount rate of 5% (reflecting anticipated growth) would be appropriate.   
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  Interestingly, our simulation finds that a spectrum increase of 200 MHz leads to a 
decrease in wireless industry revenues. This effect can be explained by the relatively 
competitive initial structure of the American wireless market, as indicated by HHI = 
1648.  This underscores the important economic point that increasing the supply of an 
input will be a mixed blessing for incumbent service providers, which leads to a crucial 
political implication: incumbent licensees may rationally resist new spectrum allocations 
even if they are to receive licenses without charge.  Given that an auction regime requires 
licensees to pay market prices for licenses,
30 it is likely that political coalitions will form 
(organized by incumbents) to slow spectrum allocations.  Indeed, this outcome is 
observed.
31
  These simulations suggest at least three important conclusions.  First, the welfare 
effect of an increase in spectrum is strongly positive.  Second, the distribution of gains 
appears to strongly favor consumer surplus relative to efficiency gains seen to results 
from collecting public revenues via license auctions.  The tendency should actually be 
even stronger than shown, because producers’ surplus represents an upper bound on rent 
extraction, and we increase rents generously by counting all incremental revenues as 
profits.  Finally, auction revenues (in each simulation) form an inverted U-shape when 
mapped as a function of allocated spectrum.  Auction revenue maximization then, will 
predictably conflict with efficient utilization of radio spectrum, as it will direct policy 
makers to avoiding moving past the high point on the revenue hill.   
  We turn now to auction design features intended to increase revenues generated 
by competitive bidding for licenses.  We evaluate how economic welfare is affected in 
retail wireless markets effects pursuant to such policies, and investigate how including 
final market effects alters the analysis.  The following examples are based on Hazlett and 
Muñoz (2004). 
                                                 
30   It is not contradictory to say that a given increment of new bandwidth would lower aggregate industry 
profits and that licensees being awarded access to this bandwidth would pay positive prices for permits.  
Such licenses would still be valuable inputs in competing against other service providers; gaining access to 
additional frequency space becomes a defense to protect against further depreciation of network assets. 
31  The FCC has not made additional spectrum available to licensed wireless phone operators since 120 
MHz of spectrum were allocated to PCS licenses in 1994.  In early 2001, when new wireless phone licenses 
had been prepared for auction, incumbent carriers lobbied against the sale.  The auctions were then delayed, 
with regulators announcing that revenues would increase if the government were to wait.  The licenses have 
yet to be sold in August 2004, and the spectrum remains essentially unutilized.   29 
•  Reservation Prices in Belgium and Greece   
It is well known that the use of reserve prices helps to increase revenues for the 
auctioneer.  But the incremental revenue is not without social cost especially when the 
object auctioned is an input in a production process; the spectrum allocated to unsold 
licenses reduces operator efficiency and, perhaps, market competitiveness.  While the 
latter implies that network entry would have occurred if the license were priced below the 
reserve level, the former does not.   
  In 2001, 3G auctions in Belgium and Greece had similar structure.  Three 2G 
incumbents were allowed to bid on four licenses, each allocated about 35 MHz.  Reserve 
prices were set; in either country, no fourth bidder emerged, and each incumbent was 
awarded a license.  Klemperer (2002a, 840) describes the situation thusly:   
 
Both countries held auctions for four licenses – and in each case attracted 
only the three incumbents, who therefore obtained licenses at the reserve 
prices which yielded about 45 Euros per capita in each case. It is very hard 
to argue plausibly that an auction deterred much entry when a license goes 
unsold, and there is also no obvious reason to criticize the reserve prices 
that these governments chose. 
 
  This is a particularly vivid example of the revenue-centric focus of the economic 
analysis.  Since government policies limited incumbents to one license apiece, and 
foreclosed the possibility that the spectrum allocated the fourth license could be 
reallocated by the market, the reservation price policy effectively withheld allocated 
bandwidth.  Indeed, as noted above by Ausubel & Cramton (1999, p. 12), withholding 
supply when bidders are few is the purpose of a reserve price.    But reducing the 
availability of spectrum inputs is far from costless.  To estimate the value of the 
opportunities sacrificed, we simulate two alternative scenarios, abandoning the reserve 
price policy adopted: 
 
  (1) an entrant, at license price = 0, builds a fourth network;   30 
  (2) no rival enters, but spectrum allocated the 4
th license is available to     
incumbents.   
 
  The change in consumer surplus estimated under the 1
st (new entrant) scenario is 
“DCS1”; the estimated change in consumer surplus under the 2
nd (spectrum reallocation) 
scenario is “DCS2.”  These changes, negative given that spectrum is being withheld by 
the reserve price policy, are compared, in absolute value, to the positive welfare effects 
associated with auction revenues.  Here we assume that one-third of such revenues 
constitute social savings due to reduced activity-distorting taxation, identified as “SV 
Rev.” We take the polar case, attributing all revenues to the reserve price policy 
(assuming no positive price would be bid in its absence).   
  The relevant comparison is between DCS and SV Rev.  Focusing on DCS2, the 
lower “value of spectrum” estimate,
32 reveals that social losses from the reserve policy 
are about twelve times the magnitude of expected public financing gains in Belgium, and 
about four times higher in Greece.  This suggests that radio spectrum is severely under-
allocated by virtue of the reserve price policy, giving economists ample reason for 
criticism. 
 
•  Subsidizing Weak Bidders in U.S. PCS Auctions 
  Personal communications service (PCS) C-block auctions concluded in May 1996 
embraced an approach recommended in the economics literature for boosting auction 
revenue and creating social efficiencies.  U.S. regulators extended bidding credits to 
small businesses and rural telephone companies, and allowed qualified (that is, weak) 
bidders to pay for licenses over ten years, extending below-market credit terms.  The PCS 
C Block licenses were allocated 30 MHz of nationwide radio spectrum.   
  Bidding for licenses was intense; C-block winners committed to paying more than 
twice the price paid by winners of similar A and B licenses the year previous, after 
netting out credits and subsidies (Hazlett & Boliek 1999).  Yet, service was not provided; 
the overwhelming majority of licensees soon declared bankruptcy, effectively defaulting 31 
on long-term obligations to the federal government, while retaining control of the 
licenses.  Through May 2004, allocated spectrum – nearly one-sixth the total bandwidth 
allocated to mobile phone service – had gone unused.   
  In Table V.3 we estimate that this loss of bandwidth in the wireless telephone 
market over the eight year period, 1996-2003, cost the U.S. economy approximately $39 
billion (2004 dollars). These welfare losses are in the range estimated in an alternative 
empirical framework by Wilkie (2004). This amount dominates any plausible public 
financing gains from auction design enhancements.  In fact, aggregate revenues collected 
for all U.S. wireless licenses, 1994-2002, amounted to just $14 billion.
33  
  As a policy initiative, see the FCC bidding preferences as richly deserving of the 
term “fiasco.”  Yet, these FCC preferences serve the economics literature as a 
paradigmatic example of how to intensify bidding.  Social costs of favoring less efficient 
providers are seen to be dominated by public financing gains from revenue extraction: 
“partially subsidizing disadvantaged bidders, generally, more than compensates for the 
cost of the subsidy due to increased aggressiveness by first-line bidders” (Rothkopf et al., 
2003, 82).  This relatively recent conclusion follows from an analysis that is 
“complementary to Ayres and Cramton (1996),” which found “that a subsidy policy can 
sometimes materially benefit the bidtaker” (Rothkopf et al., 2003, 72).  But the 
overwhelming loss of welfare in the 1996 PCS auction credits does not enter the policy 
analysis. While the government’s credit policies proved faulty,
34  the salient fact for 
welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policy is that any rule favoring less efficient 
providers entails expected costs.
35
 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Based on the model estimated above, the simulations show that the spectrum would be used most 
efficiently by an entrant (abstracting from the cost of capital). In other words, DCS1 > DCS2 in absolute 
values. 
33   Reported totals, often as high as $40 billion, count uncollected and/or uncollectible bids.  Source: The 
Budget for Fiscal Year 2003, Appendix, Federal Communications Commission, Status of Direct Loans, 
1122. 
34  FCC Chairman Michael Powell believes that, as reported in the trade press: “the FCC learned its lesson 
from the NextWave/C-block debacle and will no longer auction off licenses using installment payments.”  
Heather Forsgren Weaver, RCR WIRELESS NEWS,  NextWave Must Shed Most of Its Spectrum Under FCC 
Settlement (April 20, 2004).
35   Ayres and Cramton (1996, 11) discuss the possibility that licensees will default on long-term debt 
obligations, but dismiss its empirical significance: "If a designated bidder defaulted, the government could 
easily foreclose and resell the licenses, but their resale value would be uncertain." 32 
6. Conclusion 
 
Assigning, or licensing, is the last step in the process of granting a right to 
use a part of the spectrum and has only limited consequences for economic 
efficiency in the context of the overall system (CBO 1992, 3). 
 
  What really matters in spectrum allocation design?  The evidence indicates that 
the answer is two-fold: spectrum and competition.   This conclusion holds after adjusting 
for the social savings possible from efficient rent extraction via license auctions.   
Consider the U.S. market for wireless telephony where, in 2003, revenues totaled about 
$90 billion.  Using parameters obtained in our cross-country pricing model, an increase 
of 60 MHz in spectrum allocated for mobile telephony in the United States is associated 
with a decline of in retail prices of about 20 percent – from approximately 11 cents per 
minute of use to about nine cents per MOU.  A price drop of this magnitude is, in turn, 
associated with an increase in consumer surplus of about $24 billion annually.   
  Given marginal license valuations of about $1.65/MHz/pop, the capitalized value 
of nationwide licenses allocated 60 MHz (even under the strong assumption that marginal 
valuations do not decline over the incremental increase) is about $27 billion.  If the public 
finance dividend of $0.33 per auction dollar raised applies, the social gain of $9 billion is 
dominated by the annual gains associated with increased output.  In fact, a licensing 
delay of less than six months would swamp the public financing efficiency altogether.  
Focusing on ways to extract greater revenue, including delays or other limitations on 
productive use of radio spectrum, are penny wise and pound foolish. 
  Yet, the economic analysis of wireless license auctions has focused on revenues 
extracted from bidders, seeing the “embarrassingly low revenue in the Netherlands,” for 
example, as indicating a fiasco in public policy (Wolfstetter 2001, 6; citing Klemperer 
2000).    It might also be noted that the Dutch have succeeded in making 355 MHz 
available for wireless phone operators – more than any other EU country.   Alternatively, 
U.S. regulators have made less than 189 MHz of bandwidth available for use in wireless 
telephone markets, an outcome that merits little scholarly attention despite the “fiasco” it 
produces in lost productivity.   33 
  A burgeoning economic literature on wireless license auctions maintains a 
standard assumption that spectrum allocation rules are exogenous to competitive bidding 
mechanisms.  If true, rents transferred to government in auctions would, virtually by 
definition, have no social cost.  But common policy recommendations include reserve 
prices, bidding credits for weak bidders, and a reduction in the number of licenses issued.  
Each of these measures imposes expected costs on consumers, effectively breeching the 
assumed line of demarcation.  In addition, the process of designing more sophisticated 
auction mechanisms has resulted in delaying license assignments, depriving markets of 
valuable inputs.  The collateral damage inflicted by measures to enhance license bids is 
particularly problematic given the preponderance of consumer surplus in the social 
welfare calculus.  
  We do not argue against the use of license auctions; just the reverse.
36  Auctions 
can be highly useful in eliminating the costs of secondary market recontracting, one of 
the reasons that random distribution of licenses (as was done by lottery for most cellular 
permits in the the U.S.) is inefficient.  Paul Milgrom’s explanation of why it misuses the 
Coase Theorem to argue for random license assignments is well taken (Milgrom 2004, p. 
21).  Yet this efficiency rationale for distributing rights to the most productive service 
providers conflict with proposals commonly made, and the conflicts are omitted when 
identifying “successes” and “fiascoes.”  Policies that alter market structure or the 
availability of spectrum inputs are not exogenous to spectrum allocation.  They are 
properly considered within that context. 
  Moreover, the efficiency gains from wireless rights that are empirically most 
compelling lie in improving performance in output markets.   By increasing bandwidth 
allocated to market competitors, by promoting rivalry among licensees, and expanding 
property rights granted licensees very large efficiency gains are possible.  As shown in 
our simulations or in empirical research concerning the importance of technological 
standards competition, (Grindley et al., 1999; Gandal at al., 2003) liberalization of 
wireless markets is likely to be the key policy component driving substantial gains in 
social welfare. 34 
TABLE II.1.  PRICES PAID FOR 3G LICENSES IN EUROPE 
 
Country   Date   (US$/pop-MHz)   Euros/pop 
        
Austria 
  Nov-00   0.604   100 
Belgium 
  Mar-01   0.375   45 
Denmark 
  Sep-01   0.623   95 
Germany 
  Aug-00   3.884   615 
Greece 
  Jul-01   0.394   45 
Italy 
  Oct-00   1.494   240 
Netherlands 
  Jul-00   1.093   170 
Switzerland 
  Dec-00   0.120   20 
UK 
  Apr-00   4.310   650 
 
        






























                                                                                                                                                 
36   One of the authors of this paper argued publicly for FCC license auctions years before Congress enacted 
reform.  See Thomas W. Hazlett, “Making Money Out of the Air,” New York Times (Dec. 2, 1987); 









RPM     Price is proxied as revenue per minute in US$ for mobile voice 
services.  
totmin     Output in the regression is measured as total minutes of use.  
Units are in millions. 
HHI   Herfindahl-Hirshman Index in the country’s mobile market (0 
to 10,000). 
Spectrum  Aggregate bandwidth available in MHz for mobile phone 
service by all operators in the market. 
Density   A proxy for capital investment requirements.  Measured as 
mean inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Auction   Dummy variable = 1 if wireless licenses awarded via auction; 
0 elsewise. 
Notcpp     Dummy variable = 1 if the market not using calling party pays 
rule. 
Gdppc     Gross Domestic Product per capita in US$. 
Fixprice   Mean price of 3-minute call in US$ using fixed network (peak 
period). 
In the regression reported in Table V.2, an “L” in front of the variable denotes the natural 















TABLE V.1: LOG-LOG MODEL. DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 
LN(RPM). 
(ALL ESTIMATIONS USE A RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL) 
 





































































































No.Observations  469 451 488 
R-Square  Within  0.4296 0.6455 0.6409 
R-Square Between   0.3717  0.1073  0.4353 
R-Square  Overall  0.3773 0.1374 0.4134 
Two Stage IV estimation in Panel Data. Values of z-statistics in parentheses: *, **, *** refer to 99%, 95%, 














totmin MM/month 4574 750 78340
HHI 0-10000 2600 2900 1648
spectrum MHz 200 140 170
density hab./sq(km) 241 20 30.27
a u c t i o n 0 - 1 101
notcpp 0-1 0 0 1
gdppc US$ 25000 5000 37312
fixprice US$ 0.18 0.12 1.8E-35
delta Spectrum Effects
20
Delta Price (%) -3.8% -4.9% -7.1%
Delta Quantities (%) 6.5% 7.9% 13.6%
Change in CS (US$ MM) 9291 1002 159661
Change in Revenues (US$ MM) 5757 500 115432
80
Delta Price (%) -13.5% -16.4% -24.6%
Delta Quantities (%) 22.9% 26.2% 46.9%
Change in CS (US$ MM) 35392 3646 636998
Change in Revenues (US$ MM) 15096 1077 226440
140
Delta Price (%) -21.5% -25.5% -38.4%
Delta Quantities (%) 36.6% 40.7% 73.3%
Change in CS (US$ MM) 59926 6015 1101435
Change in Revenues (US$ MM) 17167 948 141123
200
Delta Price (%) -28.6% -33.5% -50.0%
Delta Quantities (%) 48.7% 53.4% 95.4%
Change in CS (US$ MM) 83853 8314 1548388





TABLE V-4.  SIMULATION SUMMARY 
units Belgium Greece
Auction date 2001/Q1 2001/Q3
extra license (MHz) 35.4 35
change in price (%) -4.59% -3.62%
change in MOU (%) 7.27% 5.73%
change in CS1 (extra operator) US$ MM -2243.66 -1055.32
change in CS2 (current operators) US$ MM -1603.16 -636.83
total rev. in auction US$ MM 408.92 434.96








TABLE V. 5: WELFARE COSTS OF WEAK BIDDER 
SUBSIDIES IN U.S. PCS AUCTIONS 
year delta CS inflation rate Adjusted delta CS
(US$ MM) (US$ MM, 2004) 
1996 847.2 2.9 1022.1
1997 1060.2 2.3 1243.0
1998 1543.1 1.5 1768.5
1999 2518.8 2.2 2780.0
2000 4055.7 3.4 4480.7
2001 6456.6 2.8 6898.7
2002 9168.8 1.6 9529.8
2003 11262.3 2.3 11521.4
Total 39244.2
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FIGURE V.5: WELFARE EFFECT OF WITHHOLDING  



















APPENDIX 1:  MOBILE VOICE MARKET DATABASE 
 
 
Sources of Information 
 
“Global Wireless Matrix 2Q03: Quarterly Update on Global Wireless Industry Metrics,” 
Merrill Lynch Global Securities Research & Economics Group, Global Fundamental 
Equity Research Department. This includes quarterly data for the wireless market in 46 
countries, fourth quarter 1998 through second quarter 2003.  All data were obtained from 
this source except the following: 
 
 
Spectrum, Auction: The main source is each country’s telecommunications regulator and 
Communications Ministry. The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire database, the 
European Commission and the European Radio Communications Office are secondary 
sources. 
 
GDPPC (GDP per capita): International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) Database. April 2003. 
 
Density: It was constructed as population/area, where population is from Merrill Lynch 
and area is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2003. 
 
Fixprice: It was taken from the International Telecommunications Union’s World 
Telecommunications Indicators 2002 database. 
 
Our sample is comprised of all observations in the Merrill Lynch database for which we 
have data for all the relevant variables from the first quarter in 1999 through the second 
quarter in 2003.  (While Merrill Lynch data begin in fourth quarter 1998, the data listed 
in that quarter are very incomplete.)  Our sample included the following 29 countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. 
 
Of the 46 countries in the Merrill Lynch database, many could not be used due to missing 
data (for variables not included in the ML database).  The most difficult data to identify 
included Spectrum and Fixprice.  To enable the inclusion of additional country data, 
Fixprice was adjusted in the following countries: 
 
•  Canada: The reported values are zero from 1991 to 1994; thereafter it is not 
reported.  We used an assumed value of “0” after 1994.  
•  Sweden: The value increases monotonically until 1999; it is not reported 
thereafter.  We used the variable with missing values (i.e., data from Sweden was 
not included in regressions using Fixprice).   44 
APPENDIX 2: CONSUMER SURPLUS AS A PROPORTION OF WIRELESS 
VOICE REVENUES. 
 
The goal of this appendix is to obtain a rough, conservative approximation of the 
consumer surplus in the mobile voice market in the United States.  The following table 
describes the time path of revenues and minutes of use from June 1991 to June 2003.   
 
 


































Minutes of use data obtained from CTIA Semi-Annual Data Survey Results, 1985-2003,  
November 2003, Table 110. 
Total service revenues data obtained from CTIA Semi-Annual Data Survey Results,  




Based on the data in Table A2.1 we produce the following graph, and fit the indicated 
fourth-order equation: 
 
Plot of Six-Month Total Service Revenues per MOU against MOU
y = 8.18E-23 x
4 - 8.84E-17 x
3 + 3.52E-11 x






















This summarizes the price-quantity relationship over time, but is not a demand curve due 
to the movement of other demand-impacting variables.  These other factors include the 
increase in quality of wireless networks, the decreasing costs of handsets, and the 
increasing quality of handsets.  We argue that the net effect of these other variables 
would be to shift demands outward (i.e., quantities would tend to be larger in each time 
period).  If correct, then the actual quantities are lower bound estimates of the quantity 
demanded at given prices in June 2003.  By integrating over this (actual historical) 
relationship, we can calculate a lower bound for consumer surplus.  We find that it equals 
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